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Abstract. Financial exchange operators cater to the needs of their users
while simultaneously ensuring compliance with the financial regulations.
In this work, we focus on the operators’ commitment for fair treatment
of all competing participants. We first discuss unbounded temporal fair-
ness and then investigate its implementation and infrastructure require-
ments for exchanges. We find that these requirements can be fully met
only under ideal conditions and argue that unbounded fairness in FIFO
markets is unrealistic. To further support this claim, we analyse several
real-world incidents and show that subtle implementation inefficiencies
and technical optimizations suffice to give unfair advantages to a mi-
nority of the participants. We finally introduce, -fairness, a bounded
definition of temporal fairness and discuss how it can be combined with
non-continuous market designs to provide equal participant treatment
with minimum divergence from the existing market operation.
1 Introduction
First-in-first-out (FIFO) markets process incoming messages in the same tem-
poral order they arrive to the matching engine. Thus, reaction time to market
events is one the most important factors in the competition for scarce resources.
Following the introduction of electronic trading, many firms sought to decrease
their reaction time to market events by automating their strategies (i.e., algo-
rithmic trading) and by improving their technology (e.g., optimize their trad-
ing models, establish faster network links, upgrade their software and hardware
stacks). Over time, this evolved into a technological arms race between several
firms competing for better placement at the order book1. The average reaction
time has drastically reduced, initially from seconds to milliseconds, and soon
after down to microseconds and nanoseconds.
For any FIFO market race to be fair, participants must be treated equally
and compete only on the basis of their respective reaction times. In this work, we
argue that unconditionally equal treatment of the participants in FIFO markets
is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve. This is primarily due to FIFO’s im-
plementation and infrastructural requirements that are hard to consistently meet
in practice. For example, exchanges (whose participants may have nanosecond-
scale reaction times) must ensure that their infrastructure does not introduce any
1Orders who occupy the top of the order book have better access to liquidity [10].
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delays that could alter the relative arrival times of competing orders [25,28,31].
However, networking equipment (e.g., network switches) is rarely certified to
guarantee equal latency on all ports at a nanosecond scale [25]. To better under-
stand the deployment complexities of FIFO order-matching, we study several
real-life incidents where exchanges failed to maintain a level playing field for
all market participants. Most of these incidents were due to unintentional, sub-
tle infrastructural inefficiencies but, in certain cases, participants intentionally
further exacerbated the timing discrepancies through technical2 optimizations.
Based on the insights from our survey, we then argue that unbounded tempo-
ral fairness is an elusive goal and introduce a bounded extension. This more
practical version of fairness could improve the microstructural transparency of
financial exchanges as well as allow participants to determine if the degree of
temporal fairness provided by an exchange is acceptable given their strategies.
Overall, this paper makes the following contributions:
– Defines the implementation and infrastructure requirements that must be
fulfilled by every exchange using an unbounded FIFO order-matching policy.
– Surveys several “unfairness” incidents from financial exchanges and investi-
gates their root causes.
– Introduces a bounded version of fairness that improves the market trans-
parency towards participants and could serve as a reference point for regu-
lators.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some fundamental concepts of electronic markets
and outline the operation of modern exchanges.
2.1 Market Structure
Figure 1 illustrates the different actors and components of an electronic market
and their interactions. Market participants (Pi) submit their orders to the ex-
change either through brokers or directly to the exchange’s gateways. Brokers
are used by participants who trade low volumes, while those with higher vol-
umes usually prefer to place their computers in the exchange’s premises (i.e.,
colocation) and connect directly to the exchange (i.e., direct market access).
In both cases, the exchange receives the incoming orders through its gateways
which filter out invalid orders and forward the rest to be matched. To balance
the load and reduce latency under heavy traffic conditions, exchanges tend to
deploy several order gateways very close to the matching engine [30].
Once an order is received, it is placed in the order book where the matching
algorithm ranks, pairs and fills it with those of other participants. 3 Once a
2In this work, we use the term “technical” to refer to knowledge, machines, or meth-
ods used in science and industry. This is not to be confused with “technical analysis”
that refers to the analysis of statistical trends.
3A more thorough treatment of the limit order book is provided by Gould et al. [16].
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match is found, the order is closed and removed from the book, if the entire open
quantity of the order has been filled. Otherwise, the book’s record is updated to
include only the remaining (unfilled) quantity. Participants remain up to date
on their pending orders and the state of the order book through the market’s
data feeds which are routed through the exchange’s update servers. Depending
on their feed subscription type, participants may receive only periodic snapshots
of the order book or near-realtime updates on the trading activity.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the components of an electronic financial exchange. Participants
submit their orders through their brokers (orange rectangles) or directly to the ex-
change’s gateways (blue rectangles). The gateways then forward all valid orders to
the matching engine, which pairs bids and offers and updates the order book with
the remaining quantities. Market participants remain up to date with the market by
subscribing to one of the available market feeds.
2.2 Order-Matching Policies
Order-matching policies specify the manner by which a financial exchange must
process (e.g., rank, match, hide) the order messages it receives from market par-
ticipants. Currently, one of the most commonly used policies is FIFO (also known
as first-come-first-serve matching) [37]. Under this policy, the matching engine
processes order messages in the same temporal order in which the messages were
received. Consequently, in markets with scarce resources, participants who react
fast to market events have higher allocation chances compared to participants
with slower reaction times.
In modern exchanges, this speed-related competition has three different man-
ifestations depending on the roles of the competing parties i.e., maker vs. maker,
taker vs. taker and maker vs. taker4. In the first case, makers compete with other
4In finance literature, “market makers” provide liquidity to the market (i.e., post
resting orders that populate the limit order book), while “takers” remove liquidity
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makers for the best position in the queue at each price level in the limit order
book. An order that is earlier in the queue at a price level is much more likely to
get filled than one positioned later in the queue [13,35]. Similarly, takers compete
with other takers for favorably-priced bids and offers of scarce resources [13]. The
first taker order to the market has access to the full offered volume, while sub-
sequent ones have a lower chance of getting filled, as the volume decreases. A
maker who is trying to cancel their “stale” bid or offer may also compete with
taker(s) who are trying to lift that bid or offer. This practice is called “sniping”
and involves fast takers buying assets from or selling assets to slower makers at
‘stale’ bid and offer prices [4,13,21,27]. A more thorough analysis of matching
policies can be found in [20].
3 Unbounded Temporal Fairness
In economic theory, fair races for a resource in contention are won by the “fastest”
participant if the order book operates in a continuous FIFO manner [4,17]. Two
market participants PA and PB are said to compete for a trading opportunity op if
responding to the same economic stimulus (e.g., market event), they both submit
order messages that seek to capture op [1,27,29]. We define as reaction time the
time that elapses between the receipt of the stimulus by a participant P and the
submission of an order responding to the stimulus by P . In the rest of this paper,
we adopt the position of [4,17] and assume that a market participant’s speed is
a function of their (direct or indirect) investment in technology i.e., the more a
participant spends the faster they are expected to be. With this in mind, we can
now provide a definition of temporal fairness in financial exchanges [27,29]:
Definition 1. Temporally Fair Race: Given a market event occurring at time te,
a race between two participants PA and PB with reaction times rA and rB is fair,
if for the arrival times of their orders (tA and tB) it holds that: tA = te + rA + l
and tB = te + rB + l, where l is constant.
The constant l represents the various transmission delays of the exchange’s
infrastructure (e.g., network link latency for market updates, order transmis-
sion latency, order processing latency). A more relaxed version of this definition
that seeks to bring slower and faster participants onto “equal footing” has been
discussed in [27,29,33,32]. We can now define when an exchange is temporally
fair.
Definition 2. Temporally Fair Exchange: A financial exchange is considered
temporally fair, if all the races between all possible pairs of its participants are
always temporally fair.
by placing orders that are ‘marketable’ (so immediately match with makers’ orders
causing those maker orders to be removed from the book). These roles are not fixed
and participants transition from maker to taker depending on the side of the trade
they take.
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4 FIFO Requirements
Intuitively, FIFO matching appears to conform with the above definition of tem-
poral fairness by-design (see Section 3) as orders are ranked and matched based
on their relative arrival time at the exchange’s engine. However, a FIFO market
design can maintain its fairness properties only if orders always reach the match-
ing engine in the same relative order they were sent. Similarly, market updates
should reach all the colocated participants simultaneously so as to ensure that
no one has more time to react. More formally, a FIFO deployment is temporally
fair if it remains compliant with the following three requirements at all times:
Consistent & Simultaneous market updates
Given a market event e occurring at time te and two colocated participants who
receive the corresponding market update at times tA and tB respectively, it must
always hold that tA − te = tB − te, for every possible pair of participants.
Preserve relative submission order
Given two colocated participants whose orders were sent at times tA and tB and
arrived at the matching engine at times t′A and t′B , it must always hold that
t′A − tA = t′B − tB .
Honor price-time priority
Given an order oA that arrives at the matching engine at time tA and a competing
order5 oB that arrives at tB , if tA < tB , it must always hold that oA will be
executed before oB (unless oA is explicitly cancelled by the participant).
5 Practical Considerations
As outlined in Sections 3 and 4, temporally fair markets require that participants
compete solely on the basis of their reaction time while every other factor of the
system remains constant for all of them. However, the practicality of these strict
requirements is questionable. We now survey various incidents from the relevant
literature as well as legal reports and show that in various cases participants
experienced favourable or unfavourable order submission latency or market up-
date delay due to technical inefficiencies.
Infrastructure Jitter. Electronic exchanges comprise a plurality of hardware
and software components that exhibit small non-constant variations in their
processing times. For example, modern computers are optimized for maximum
performance (i.e., instruction throughput) and thus do not guarantee determin-
istic execution times. This is due to speculative execution, cache eviction in the
presence of competing processes, charge-to-read and data prefetching that con-
tribute to variances in the process execution runtimes in a range between a few
5The term “competing orders” refers to lit orders for the same instrument that
reside on the same order book side and price level.
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nanoseconds to a few hundred microseconds [34,15]. Furthermore, distributed
network architectures (such as those used by major financial exchanges) also
introduce discrepancies in the processing times and asymmetries in the data
dissemination speed. This is attributed to the various performance differences
between replicated components. For instance, an order gateway may be sig-
nificantly less crowded compared to the rest of the gateways, thus providing
favourable submission times to its users [39]. To address this, market operators
strive to maintain their systems perfectly symmetrical and load balanced at all
times with nanosecond [25] precision. While this can reduce the magnitude of
the problem, differences cannot be fully eliminated even if the exchange uses and
fine-tunes the exact same hardware and software in all of its replicated compo-
nents.
Uneven Information Dissemination. Another potential point of failure with
regards to temporal fairness are the market operations that involve information
dissemination. Such operations, if not implemented carefully, have the potential
to introduce discrepancies in the times that information is received by differ-
ent participants. For example, Tick-by-Tick data feeds update participants after
every change in the order book and must be received by all subscribed partic-
ipants simultaneously. However, perfect synchronicity is technically challenging
to achieve in practice. In a relevant incident, the data feed servers at the Na-
tional Stock Exchange (NSE) of India were reportedly transmitting the updates
in a sequential, non-randomized manner to the subscribed participants, while the
order gateways differed in capabilities and loads [39]. In particular, market up-
dates were transmitted in the same order participants logged in (on a per server
basis), thus enabling participants with knowledge of this technicality to gain an
advantage by logging in early. This resulted in unfair races as some participants
were consistently receiving market updates before everyone else (Requirement 1
in Section 4). From a technical perspective, one-shot multicast could potentially
decrease the latency discrepancies by transmitting all the updates almost simul-
taneously6. Unfortunately, even in this case, the inter-arrival discrepancies are
reduced but not eliminated [22]. During the same incident, participants were also
found to actively delay updates to others by unnecessarily occupying positions
in the queue of update servers they were not using [39]. Similar practices have
been reported in various other exchanges and markets [14,12,18].
Request Broadcasting. As discussed in Section 2.1, major exchanges have
a modular (cf. monolithic) architecture with several replicated components to
improve their responsiveness and minimize their downtime. However, compo-
nent replication can have an impact on fairness as there may be fluctuations in
the performance of the different components over time. Participants can take
advantage of such discrepancies even if they have no information about the per-
formance of the individual components (e.g., order gateways). In past incidents,
6Multicast based on fanout-spitting or application-layer multicast overlay services
suffer from delay problems similar to those of unicast [36].
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participants were found to simultaneously broadcast copies of their orders to
all available gateways [6]. This practice improves the likelihood that their order
will be routed through one of the faster (e.g., less loaded) gateways thus outrac-
ing competing participants who do not replicate their orders (Requirement 2 in
Section 4). Various exchanges have taken measures to counter order replication,
usually by limiting the number of simultaneous connections that are permitted
per participant [8,9,14,12].
Fig. 2. Illustration of how out-of-band channels can impair fairness in exchanges with
decentralized order books. In such exchanges, orders submitted at the local order book
(e.g., New York) may be routed to one of the geographically distributed nodes (e.g.,
London) that offers the best price. The nodes route orders to each other through a
direct high-bandwidth network link (A), while participants are updated through the
market data feeds of each order book. However, this structure assumes that there is no
link B that provides lower latency than A. If such a link becomes available, participants
can use it to front-run orders as they are routed across the nodes.
Out-of-band Channels. A common practice for market participants is to use
private fast network links to aggregate market data from multiple venues so as
to take better informed trading decisions. In centralized exchanges, this prac-
tice does not violate any of the fairness requirements as the order submission
latency and the update-feed delays remain constant. However, fast external links
may have an adverse effect on the fairness of exchanges with decentralized order
books. Such exchanges maintain several geographically-distributed nodes (i.e.,
order books) that use a network link to route incoming orders to the node that
currently offers the best price (Figure 2). Thus, an incoming order that gets
submitted in London may be routed to New York to be matched. However, this
assumes that any participant who observes an incoming order in London will
not be able to reach the New York book before the order is routed there. While
in most cases this is a reasonable assumption (such very low-latency links across
continents are limited), the ICAP EBS venue’s [18,11] inter-region routing link
was outperformed by the Hibernia Express link, thus advantaging participants
who had subscribed to it. To address the problem, the operator introduced a
speedbump (i.e., a short constant delay) that alleviated the latency advantage
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provided by the faster network link [11].
Communication Protocol Violations. In networks that use store-and-forward
switching, each complete transmission unit (e.g., frame, packet) is copied to the
switch’s memory buffer and checked for potential errors (e.g., cyclic redundancy
checks) before it gets forwarded to the next node. Therefore, the processing time
of each message by the switch depends on its size as the whole unit must be re-
ceived before any checks are performed. In 2015, a market participant was found
to exploit this process by intentionally truncating data fields in their outgoing
orders. This resulted in invalid data in some non-critical fields but gave them
an advantage over other competing participants as switches would process their
orders faster [6,7].
Participants have been also found to take advantage of the inherent proper-
ties of communication protocols. In networks, large messages are often split into
fixed-size fragments that are sent to their destination sequentially. The recipient
stores the incoming fragments into a memory buffer and combines them to re-
construct the original message. However, message fragmentation may result in
ambiguity with regards to the arrival times of incoming messages. This is of par-
ticular importance in electronic exchanges as fragments of two competing orders
(i.e., messages) may arrive interweaved. To resolve this, matching engines have
introduced tie-breaking policies that allow them to determine the relative order
of incoming orders in a consistent manner. One such policy timestamps incoming
orders based on the arrival time of their first fragment (e.g., IP packet). This
timestamp is then used to determine their relative precedence in the order book.
Unfortunately, this policy is prone to optimistic messaging, a form of technical
gaming. Optimistic messaging relies on the fact that orders are timestamped
with the arrival time of the first fragment but cannot be reconstructed until
all fragments have arrived [23,19,25]. A strategic participant can exploit this to
establish precedence in the book for orders they may intend to submit in the fu-
ture. For example, given an economic event that is to occur at a specific time te,
a participant preemptively sends a fragment of an order shortly before te (a few
milliseconds early) to establish precedence in the order book. Then, depending
on the outcome of the event, the participant can decide to trade on the news
and transmit the rest of the order’s fragments, or drop the incomplete order
(e.g., by invalidating the network/application-layer checksum in the remaining
fragments). Depending on the variant used by the participant, the pre-event
fragments may contain the fields of the order that are not trade-specific (e.g.,
participant ID) or may contain event-depend data if the event has only a few
potential outcomes.
Unintended Order Interactions. Electronic markets paved the way for so-
phisticated order types that realize conditional interactions with the order book.
However, the additional complexity introduced by those orders, made it more
difficult for operators to account for all possible interaction scenarios. For exam-
ple, certain order types (e.g., intermarket sweep orders, hide and light orders)
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could under specific conditions overtake other orders who preceded them in the
execution queue (Requirement 3 in Section 4) [3,26]. While these order types
were available to everyone, their existence and operation was poorly communi-
cated thus resulting in an unfair asymmetry between the participants who were
aware of their operation and those who did not [40,5,3,2]. In another occasion,
the interaction between two order-types on New York Stock Exchange enabled
participants to use pegging orders to detect the presence (but not the volume) of
hidden orders [38]. As a result, participants who exploited this design flaw could
retrieve additional information on the current state of the order book compared
to those that relied only on the market feeds. While this order interaction was
a bug, it highlights how unintended corner-cases may occur in exchanges with
complex microstructure.
6 Bounded temporal fairness
As discussed in Section 4, an exchange that guarantees fairness unconditionally
must ensure that all updates arrive simultaneously to all its colocated partici-
pants. However, unlike price, time is continuous and thus simultaneity is unreal-
istic, especially considering the various hardware and software imperfections. We
thus argue that unbounded fairness is an elusive goal. Instead, fairness should
be considered with regards to a clearly defined reference frame. We now intro-
duce bounded versions of the definitions given in Section 3 that provide such a
reference frame.
Definition 3. -Bounded Temporally Fair Race: Given a market event occur-
ring at time te, a race between two participants PA and PB with reaction times
rA and rB is -fair, if for the arrival times of their orders (tA and tB) it holds
that: tA = te + rA + l ± /2 and tB = te + rB + l ± /2, where l is constant.
As before, the constant l represents the various transmission delays of the
exchange’s infrastructure, while  quantifies the time scale at which the current
infrastructure of the exchange can provide fair treatment between the partici-
pants. For example, a switch that consistently offsets one of its ports by 1ms
can provide -fairness for  = 1ms, as the faster participant in races where
‖rA − rB‖ > 1ms will still win the race (assuming the rest of the infrastructure
exhibits no jitter). For brevity, we refer to -bounded temporally fair races as
-fair.
Definition 4. (, δ)-Bounded Temporally Fair Exchange: A financial exchange
is considered temporally fair with respect to bounds  and δ, if the races between
all possible pairs of its participants are -fair with probability greater than or
equal to δ.
In the above definition, δ represents the probability that a race between
two orders will be -fair. We introduced δ, as past works have shown that the
probability distributions of the latency in distributed systems (both in financial
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exchanges and in other applications) exhibit long tails [24,25]. In a practical
setting, the operator can derive  and δ by monitoring the discrepancies occurring
in their system. Some techniques and measurement tools for this purpose have
been discussed in [25].
Overall, the above definitions provide a more practical notion of temporal
fairness as they relax the requirements for strict simultaneity in market updates
and complete precedence-preservation in orders. Bounded fairness can improve
the transparency of financial exchanges and allow participants to determine if
the degree of temporal fairness provided by an exchange is acceptable given
their strategies. Moreover,  and δ could serve as a well-defined reference point
for regulators and could drive a positive competition between exchanges.
Note, however, that these definitions do not make a statement about the
races that take place beneath the  boundary. This leaves a blind spot, where all
the races with reaction-time differences less than  could be consistently won by
the slowest competing participant. Operators can try to decrease  (and increase
δ) by upgrading their infrastructure but similarly participants are also getting
consistently faster and more sensitive to subtle differences. We argue that non-
continuous market designs at  timescales could solve this problem by uniformly
distributing the victories between participants for races beneath  [27,29,33,32].
In these market designs, the majority of the participants will experience a FIFO
market, while the small minority of ultra-fast traders will be still guaranteed at
least equal treatment at all scales.
7 Conclusions & Future Directions
This work discusses the gap between economic theory and the unavoidable com-
plexities that emerge when theoretically “fair” market models are implemented.
We focus on FIFO order-matching and its infrastructural and implementation
requirements that “fair” deployments must fulfill. Our survey of the literature
and relevant sources suggests that technical challenges make full compliance with
these strict requirements unrealistic. Instead, we propose a bounded version of
fairness that takes into account the unpredictability of hardware and software
systems. The bounds clearly define the degree of fairness that participants can
expect from an exchange and can be tightened further as the operators refine
their infrastructure. For cases that fall outside these bounds (i.e., very low la-
tency competition), discrete-time policies can be applied to guarantee at least
equal participant treatment.
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